Keywords: market-oriented computing, resource reservation, risk assessment, utility computing.

Abstract: Grid, cluster and cloud computing provide the opportunity for computing resources to be traded as commodities in an open marketplace. An options market for computing resources would allow users to reserve a resource for a fee, and then pay an additional fee later should they actually need to use it. However, a major issue is ensuring that users do not falsify their likely requirements with the objective of reducing costs while keeping their right to use the resource. This paper describes an exploratory simulation implementation of a two-period model that was proposed by Wu, Zhang and Huberman (2008) which they claimed promoted truth-telling among the population of resource-buyers who interact with a Coordinator (a central vendor) of resources, Wu et al. provided a theoretical description and analysis of their model, but presented no empirical analysis of its commercial suitability. Our work, reported in this paper, explores the model's performance where demand for resources is variable and unpredictable. Using techniques similar to replicator dynamics (from studies of evolutionary processes in biology), we explore the behaviour of heterogeneous buyer populations under different market conditions. Through empirical and theoretical analysis, we determine the optimum honesty for which the Coordinator will most effectively prosper across a range of market conditions, and show how this data can be used to protect against risk.

1 INTRODUCTION

Grid, cluster and, most recently, cloud computing have all promised to transform computing resources into a commodity, that can be delivered in a manner similar to that of existing utilities, such as electricity, gas, water and telephone services (Buyya, Yeo et al. 2009). Cloud computing in particular is primed to deliver a new level of freedom to the consumer, allowing different levels of service and quality to be delivered on an as-needed basis without the need for capital investment.

This utility model provides users with the ability to purchase computing resources as if they were any other commodity such as coal or steel. By providing a suitable mechanism for buying and selling, market oriented computing opens up a wide range of trading possibilities - CPU cycles, storage capacity, or memory allocations can be bought and sold, for current or future use. This is already happening to some extent in the market place, and a wide range of economic and resource sharing models for grids, clusters and clouds are publicly accessible. (Yeo and Buyya 2006; Hilley 2009)

However, the variable nature of IT usage means that pricing the service so that competitiveness and profitability are balanced has an element of risk. For the enterprise, determining and hedging their future demand for a resource is not an easy task. (Khajeh-Hosseini, Sommerville et al. 2010)

Currently, users purchase capability from the utility-computing provider directly: the use of centralised computing marketplaces and intermediary aggregators and brokers seem likely to grow in significance over time but have not yet done so.

Such centralised mechanisms would enable a true Service Orientated Architecture where customer needs are matched to the most suitable computing resources using brokers or Coordinator’s. This would be controlled through Service Level Agreements (SLA) which would define the metrics that must be achieved (e.g. uptime, latency) and the compensation that would be due to the customer should the metric not be achieved.

To take account of future requirements for resource, users could reserve resources through a derivatives market involving futures and/or options.
A futures contract is a contractual agreement to buy or sell an asset for a certain price at a certain time in the future. An options contract gives the contract holder the right to buy, or sell, an asset by a certain date for a certain price, without obligation. (Hull 2005)

It has been proposed that swing options, originally developed for trading electrical power, can be used to price a future reservation of computing resources (Clearwater and Huberman 2005). Analogous to electricity, computing resources are non-storable and have volatile usage patterns, so such a model would provide customers with flexibility in terms of amount and duration of resource requirement, and enables resource providers to estimate demand.

Use of such derivatives presents two problems. Firstly, how can users accurately predict their future resource requirement. Secondly, how can the user be trusted to submit a true representation of their likely resource requirements.

The first issue can be solved using a forecasting tool, such as that proposed in (Clearwater and Huberman 2005) or by analysing historical market data such as that proposed in (Sandholm, Lai et al. 2006; Sandholm and Lai 2007). For the second issue, (Wu, Zhang et al. 2008) proposed a reservation model which was shown to lead to a truthful reservation on the user's part.

In (Rogers and Cliff 2010) we simulated the reservation model proposed by Wu et al., in a multiple user, heterogeneous, variable market. Wu et al’s model involved a number of users who require the resource, plus a central authority ("the Coordinator") responsible for receiving and resolving resource requests. We showed that honesty benefits both the user and the Coordinator when the market varies uniformly, and that the user-base evolves to be more honest over time. In the same paper, we discussed how the model could be implemented commercially, and how a transaction fee could be used to offset risk.

In this paper we extend our previous work by exploring results from simulating the model when the market has heterogeneous (non-uniform) variations, and where the users make decisions based on scarcity or abundance of resources. We simulate various market conditions, and analyse how the Coordinator and users behave as a result of this changing dynamic. Finally, we discuss how our findings can be used to protect against risk in a commercial implementation.

We will look at the specific case analysed by Wu et al. where the value of two key parameters are C=2 and k=1.5. The parameter C is the cost per unit paid to the resource-providers by the Coordinator in the second (future) period; the cost per unit is 1 when purchased in the initial (current) period. The parameter k is a constant that is used to set the price per unit charged by the Coordinator to the resource-users. Exploring this case is most attractive in the first instance because it allows us to explore the extent to which the results from Wu et al.’s theoretical analysis continue to hold as some of their simplifying assumptions are relaxed. Our primary research question is to see whether the service remains profitable in a real-world, multi-user scenario, where users submit different resource probabilities using different levels of honesty, in a dynamically changing marketplace. It is this heterogeneity of user’s behaviour under different circumstances that makes our simulation an extension of the theoretical model and supporting analysis provided by Wu et al.

2 METHODOLOGY

A computer simulation was implemented in Python to replicate the model as an options contract. The algorithm performs the following steps:

1. Each user \( i \) in the range 1 to \( N \) is assigned an "honesty", \( H_i \), chosen randomly from a uniform distribution over \([0,1]\) which describes the accuracy with which a probability of future resource requirement is provided to the Coordinator. An honesty of 1 means a user will always exercise their right to purchase as per their forecast probability. An honesty of 0 means a user will never exercise their right to purchase.

2. A replicator dynamics approach is adopted, whereby for every two units of total time \( T \), a user is randomly chosen to undergo a mutation, and this user is given a new honesty. The user tries bidding and executing as per the following steps for a sample size \( S \), using the new honesty.
   a. For each user, a random resource probability, \( p_i \), is assigned. A probability of 0 means that a resource will definitely not be required in the next time period. A resource probability of 1 means a resource will definitely be required in the next time period.
b. Each user is given the opportunity to request a resource to be utilised in the next time period. The user will submit the following resource probability to the Coordinator: \( q_i = H_i \cdot p_i \).

c. The user is charged a premium of \( kq_i^2/2 \) to reserve the resource. The premium and a fixed transaction fee, \( F \), are removed from the user's bank balance, and added to the Coordinator's balance.

d. The Coordinator purchases units from the resource provider at a cost of 1 per unit. This is removed from the Coordinator's balance and added to the resource provider's balance. As an example, a user \( i \) with \( H_i = 1 \) who anticipates the future requirement with a probability of 0.8, will submit a probability of 0.8 to the Coordinator as \( q_i = H_i \cdot p_i \).

e. A user \( i \) with \( H_i = 1 \) will not always exercise their right as per their submitted probability. For instance, a user with honesty 0.7 who anticipates the future resource requirement with a probability of 0.8, will submit a probability of future resource requirement with \( q_i = H_i \cdot p_i = 0.56 \).

f. Each user is now given the option of exercising their right to use their resource.

g. A user will exercise their right where \( p_i > A \) where \( A \) is the availability of the resource. An availability of 0 means that there is no surplus of the resource and all users will exercise their right. An availability of 1 means that the resource is abundant, and no users will exercise their right.

h. \( A \) is chosen randomly from a triangular distribution, where the peak frequency of the triangle is varied to show different market conditions. An increase in the peak of the triangular distribution represents an increase in the availability of the resource - the increased frequency of random values chosen at the peak of the triangle simulate a variable market, which is biased towards either a resource scarcity or abundance. \( A_p \) is the peak and \( A_m \) is the mean of the distribution.

i. If a user wishes to use the resource, they are charged a price, \( 1+(k/2)-kq_i \), which is removed from their balance and added to the Coordinator's balance.

j. If the Coordinator has not previously purchased enough resource from the resource provider, they will purchase the deficit at a cost of \( C \) per unit.

k. This cost is removed from the Coordinator's balance and added to the resource providers.

3. Steps a-k are repeated \( S \) times, to ensure each user provides a range of probabilities to the Coordinator using the same honesty.

4. If the user finds that the mean cost per required resource over the sample \( S \) is lower using the mutated honesty, the honesty remains and the new behaviour is adopted by the user. If not, the honesty returns to its previous value and the old behaviour continues.

5. A new mutation is determined as per Step 2, and this process continues until \( T \) iterations have passed.

3 RESULTS

The simulation was executed with \( F=0.01 \), \( N=1000 \), \( S=100 \) and \( T=20000 \). See Figure 1.

![Figure 1](https://example.com/figure1.png)

Figure 1: Scatter plot of Coordinator’s profit against mean honesty (legend in Table 1).

As can be seen from Figure 1, the Coordinator generally benefits with increased profit when there is a higher availability for resources and therefore demand is low, although the amount of profit or loss is still dependent on the mean honesty of the users.
This makes sense, as users have paid a premium and a fee to use the service, but have not chosen to execute their right due to the availability of cheaper resources on the open market.

When the market is in high demand for computing resources, the Coordinator will benefit from increased profit as a result of increased mean user-base honesty. However, the Coordinator will often never make a profit regardless of the honesty of the user-base. In these situations, the Coordinator would be better off suspending sales completely or implementing a higher transaction fee (see our discussion of Dynamic Risk Offsetting, below).

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Figure 2: Best fit plot of resource surplus (legend Table 1).

However, when the availability of resources is high there appears to be a point where profit no longer increases with an increase in honesty, but peaks at an optimum honesty where the Coordinator achieves a peak profit.

Figure 2 shows the surplus/deficit of resource purchased by the Coordinator in $T=2$ at the higher rate of $C=2$. It can be seen that there is a correlation between the values of $H$ at which the peak profit occurs in Fig. 1 and the values of $H$ at which there is no surplus or deficit of resource purchased in Fig. 2.

If the Coordinator reserves too much resource in $T=1$, they have effectively purchased assets that are fully depreciated in $T=2$ and the investment has gone to waste. If the Coordinator purchases too little resource, they must purchase further resource in $T=2$, now at the higher rate of $C=2$.

Thus, the optimum mean honesty of a user-base is the honesty at which there is no surplus or deficit of resource purchased by the Coordinator. As the surplus is equal to the difference between the resource required at $T=2$ and the resource reserved at $T=1$, we can write: \[ \delta = \frac{1 - A_m}{p} (1 - H) \]

Table 1 shows how the results obtained from simulation closely match that determined using the above formula when $\overline{P} = 0.5$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$A_p$</th>
<th>$A_m$</th>
<th>Honesty at Peak Profit (Sim)</th>
<th>Honesty at Peak Profit (Calc)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.68</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Table of results.

When there is poor availability of a resource, the results show the Coordinator may make a loss in a dishonest user-base as users are more likely to execute their options, causing a deficit which must be purchased at the higher value $C=2$.

When considering implementing the model in a new market, the Coordinator must make a decision regarding whether it is strategically better to compete in a market where the user-base always shows an increasing profit for an increase in honesty (for example, as in $A_m = 0.53$) albeit for less profit, or where there is more demand for a resource, but a decline in profit may occur once a certain level of honesty has been reached by the user-base, as in $A_m = 0.6$.

### 4 PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

#### 4.1 Maximising Profit through Honesty Balancing

The simulation has shown how during times of low demand, the Coordinator’s profit peaks at a certain level of honesty across the user-base. If we want to maximise the profit during this time, it should be possible to develop an algorithm which balances the user-base such that this peak honesty is achieved.

For example, consider the situation where at $T=1$, the mean availability of the resource is $A_m = $
0.53 and at \( T=2 \) the mean availability is predicted to be \( A_{\text{mean}}=0.60 \). If users are submitting a mean probability of 0.5 then it is straightforward to calculate that at \( T=1 \), \( H^\text{bar}=0.94 \); and at \( T=2 \), \( H^\text{bar} =0.80 \). Thus, at \( T=1 \), the Coordinator will make a maximum profit when 94\% of the user-base is honest. However, at \( T=2 \) the Coordinator will make a profit when 80\% of the user-base are honest. To maximise the Coordinator’s profit, the mean honesty of the user-base should be lowered to 80\%. To achieve this we propose that there should be an ongoing process of monitoring and recording the average honesties of all users over time. Once gathered, analysis of this data in terms of sector, industry, location, and any other classifications should be done as required. This would then allow the following process to be performed in each period (i.e., at each successive value of \( T \)):

1. Determine mean market availability of market in \( T=2 \), using methods such as discussed in (Sandholm, Lai et al. 2006; Sandholm and Lai 2007)

2. Calculate \( H^\text{bar} \) for which maximum profit is achieved in \( T=2 \)

3. Using historical data and market intelligence, determine which users or segments have an honesty such that the optimum mean honesty can be achieved

4. Offer these users or segments a reduced transaction fee as an incentive to purchase options as a means of increasing or decreasing the mean honesty of the user-base

By incentivising users with a higher, or lower, mean honesty it may be possible to move the overall population mean to the optimum in \( T=2 \). This is one avenue of future research that we aim to explore.

4.2 Dynamic Risk Offsetting

As discussed in Rogers & Cliff (2010), it is possible for the Coordinator to protect herself against risk by charging an appropriate transaction fee. The new results presented in this paper show that the risk can be further offset by anticipating market demand in \( T=2 \) and charging an appropriate transaction fee.

It seems plausible that data-mining may establish that a particular customer-base is more likely to be dishonest. For example, one geographical region may be less likely to be honest to a Coordinator in a different geographical region due to previous existing social, economic, political or cultural issues, which causes an inherent lack of trust.

The term “honesty” can be here reasonably interchanged with reliability. It may be that a particular customer base has the best intentions, but regularly reserve resources with an incorrect probability. For example, a user who deals with implementing complex systems may find it more difficult to predict future usage accurately due to the longer sales, implementation and acceptance cycles brought about by determining complicated design requirements. On the other hand, a particular customer base may have a very accurate view of future requirements, such as a website that has a fixed number of users.

If the honesty of a particular segment is known, the Coordinator may choose to charge a transaction fee which varies with the market demand. Raising the fee will increase the \( y \)-intercept of the profit curve and therefore ensure a profit is achieved at lower levels of honesty.

Figure 3 shows such an event, in which the user-base has a mean honesty of 0.4 based on previous experience for the sector:

1. During a period of high availability \( A_{\text{mean}}=0.6 \), and the Coordinator takes a profit.

2. It is predicted that in the next period, availability will decrease to \( A_{\text{mean}}=0.53 \) and therefore demand will increase. If the mean honesty of the user-base were to remain constant, the Coordinator will make a loss.

3. To prevent this, the fee is raised to 0.05 which is still insignificant compared to purchasing the resource direct from the Coordinator (as \( C=2 \)) but is enough to offset this risk.

In fact, it may be possible to use the simulator in real-time with predictive algorithms to counteract the risk. Such an algorithm might look as follows:

1. Estimate demand for resources in \( T=2 \) using a method such as those discussed in (Sandholm, Lai et al. 2006; Sandholm and Lai 2007)

2. Estimate profit using the simulator, using estimates for number of users, etc.

3. An appropriate transaction fee is determined to offset any risk, which is presented to customers prior to purchasing the option.

Further work should be undertaken to determine if such inherent honesties/reliabilities exist in the addressable market, and to determine a transaction fee for each market segment such that risk and
competitive pricing are balanced. This segment specific, variable-market pricing could be a powerful differentiator.

Figure 3: Example of risk offsetting procedure.

5 CONCLUSIONS

This paper has provided an empirical demonstration of how a truth telling reservation model for computing resources described by Wu et al. can provide the basis for a commercially feasible options market in utility computing resources. The model was simulated with multiple heterogeneous users, submitting a wide range of probabilities over a long term, over a variety of market profiles. It was found that the Coordinator benefits more when resources are in abundance, and less when resources are scarce. However, it was also found that when resources are abundant, the Coordinator does not always benefit financially as the honesty of the user-base increases. There is an optimum honesty, which can be determined from a simple equation, at which the Coordinator’s profit is at a maximum.

The simulation has identified two methods that can optimise the Coordinator’s profit, and reduce her exposure to risk. The first is to bias the honesty of the user-base towards the optimum honesty for a predicted market demand by incentivising those users who have a desired honesty. The second is to vary the transaction fee payable by the user, to offset predicted changes in market demand.

By taking the results from this paper and extending them with future research into the performance of the model under different conditions and inherent honesties, in different segments, a commercial offering that is profitable to the Coordinator, beneficial to the user, and with calculable levels of risk looks likely to be achievable.

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